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Abstract 
 
In 2008, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance sent  letters to 
clients of a fraudulent tax preparer, warning them of a possible audit and asking 
them to participate in the Department’s Voluntary Disclosure and Compliance 
Program if they had filed inaccurate tax returns in the past.  This study examines 
the impact of the letters on voluntary compliance in their future (2008 and 2009) 
returns.  In this study, a simple method similar to “difference in differences”, 
which we call “difference in positions”, is applied.  10,000 samples are randomly 
drawn from the taxpayer population and the growth rates of Federal adjusted 
gross income (AGI) for these samples are put into relative frequency density 
graphs.  We then examine the relative positions of the experiment group (the 
clients of the fraudulent tax preparer) within the normally distributed curves 
before and after the letters were sent.  The change in the relative positions is 
regarded as the letter impact on voluntary compliance.  It is found that the impact 
is significant in the first year (2008 tax returns) after the letters were sent.  The 
impact is 17.49 percentage points on the AGI growth rate, which translates to 
$8.68 million of reported AGI for the 507 taxpayers in the experiment group.  
However, the impact is minimal in the second year (2009 tax returns), indicating 
that the long-run effect of the letter mailings may be weak.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since early 2007, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance has been closely 
monitoring State tax returns prepared by paid tax preparers.  Often in conjunction with other 
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State and Federal law enforcement agencies, the Tax Department has successfully prosecuted 
and convicted some fraudulent tax preparers and fined some others.  A number of fraudulent tax 
preparers chose to cooperate with the Tax Department and provided information about their 
clients.  In other instances, taxpayers have provided information about their fraudulent tax 
preparers. 
 
In 2008, one fraudulent tax preparer, whom we shall call Preparer X, made a plea bargain to 
cooperate with the Tax Department and agreed to provide a list of all his clients in order to avoid 
possible prosecution.  In October 2008 the Tax Department mailed a letter to his clients to alert 
them that their tax preparer “has admitted to assisting taxpayers in the filing of fraudulent and 
inaccurate tax returns”, and that their “tax return may be audited”.  A second letter was mailed a 
month later.  Although the tones of the two letters were different, the first letter contained 
“harsher” language and the second letter contained “softer” language, both of them asked the 
taxpayers to come forward to correct the mistakes in their past tax returns, stating “If you believe 
that you may have filed inaccurate tax returns prepared by (the name of Preparer X), it is not too 
late for you to avoid penalties by participating in the Department‟s Voluntary Disclosure and 
Compliance Program.” 
 
Both letters were sent to the clients of Preparer X in the last quarter of 2008.  In early 2009, 
when the 2008 tax returns were to be filed, those taxpayers who had received the letters had 
decisions to make.  First, they must decide if they would prepare their tax returns themselves or 
hire a new tax preparer.  Second, if they believed that they had filed inaccurate tax returns to 
reduce their tax liabilities in the past, they must decide if they would continue this practice in 
their new returns. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine if these taxpayers altered their behavior in preparing their 
tax returns after having received the targeted letters from the Tax Department.  More 
specifically, the question we try to answer is, after the taxpayers had received the letters in 
October and November of 2008, did they, as a group, change their behavior and comply more 
strictly with tax laws on their 2008 and 2009 tax returns?  
 
In the literature, there are two distinctive approaches to studying tax compliance.  The first 
approach is based on theoretical grounds; and the second is applying laboratory experiments to 
analyze the behavior shifts in compliance after simulating tax policy and regulation changes. 
 
In the first approach, the bases of theoretical grounds are not uniform among the researches in 
the literature.  One group of studies is based on the classical microeconomic theories where 
taxpayers are assumed to be rational and follow the rule of utility maximization in making their 
tax compliance decisions.  Their ultimate goal is to maximize their expected utility under 
uncertainty (For example, see Allingham and Sandmo 1972).  Another group of the studies 
introduces sociological and psychological factors, such as moral, shame, trust, political power, 
and game theory, into their theoretical considerations.  They hope these factors can explain some 
compliance phenomena which the simple utility models could not explain. (For example, see 
Bernasconi 1998, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008, and Kirchler 2007).  Under this approach, a 
wide range of interesting factors influencing tax compliance is studied.  For example, some 
researchers propose that taxpayer uncertainty has a positive effect on compliance, (Alm, Jackson, 
and McKee 1992(2), and Beck and Jung 1989).  Another example is the work by Erard and 
Feinstein (1994), who built a game-theoretic model of tax compliance which challenges the 
notion that honest taxpayers do not significantly influence most aspects of tax compliance 
systems.  
 
The second approach, the laboratory experiment approach, has been gaining popularity.  In this 
approach, experiment participants, either students or real taxpayers, are provided specific 
information regarding audit, amnesty, or other tax policies.  Then they are asked to file tax 
returns (fake or real tax returns.)  The tax return data are analyzed to reveal their compliance 
behavior.  For example, Alm and McKee (2006) apply experimental methods to examine the 
individual compliance responses to a “certain” probability of audit, and conclude that the 
compliance rate rises if an individual knows he will be audited and the rate falls if he knows he 
will not be audited.  Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001) randomly select taxpayers and 
inform them that their filling will be “closely examined‟ and found evidence of taxpayers‟ 
behavior changes in response to an increased probability of audit, although the responses are not 
uniform among different groups of taxpayers.   Another experimental research by Alm, McKee, 
and Beck (1990) finds that the effectiveness of an amnesty program depends on the design of the 
program and the enforcement efforts post the amnesty.   Alm, Jackson, and Mckee (1992(1)) use 
data from laboratory experiments to estimate the effects on compliance of the major fiscal 
instruments and conclude that, among others, there is a positive relationship between audit rate 
and compliance, but they caution about the generalization from the estimates based on the 
experiments.   Another study by Mittone (2006) concludes that early experience of audits in 
taxpayers‟ “tax life” is a more effective way to increase compliance than later audits.  Yet 
another experimental research by Kastlunger, Kirchler, Mittone, and Pitters (2009) also suggests 
that, although the effectiveness of audits and fines cannot be completely confirmed, early audits 
in taxpayers‟ “tax life” have a positive impact on compliance. For detailed discussions on the 
pros and cons of the laboratory experiment approach, see Angrist and Pischke (2010), Leamer 
(1983, 2010), Keane (2010), and Sims (2010).  
 
The study presented here is different from those in the literature in several ways.  First, we build 
a model exclusively for investigating the compliance behavior shifts for a targeted group of 
taxpayers after they received letters from the Tax Department warning them of a possible audit.  
Second, a simple research method similar to “difference in differences”, which we call 
“difference in positions”, is applied.  It is a new approach to the studies of tax compliance.  
Third, real tax return data from taxpayers are used in this study instead of experimental data 
often used in the literature.    
 
The remainder of this paper is broken down as follows: Section 2 discusses data, Section 3 
discusses the methodology used in this study, Section 4 presents the estimation procedure and 
results, Section 5 performs the statistical significance test on the estimate, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Data  
 
The study period for this research is from 2006 to 2009.  The data are from three data sets 
maintained by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.  The first data set is 
from the Department‟s legacy production system, which contains the State personal income tax 
data, including taxpayers‟ names, addresses, IDs, and other State tax return information, such as 
Federal adjusted gross income, deductions, credits, and tax liabilities.  From this data set, we 
obtain 2006 and 2007 tax return information for State taxpayers. 
 
The 2008 and 2009 personal income tax data are from a data set named “Complete” and 
populated from the Tax Department‟s new production system.  This data set contains complete 
State personal income tax return information for 2008 and 2009 at the individual level.   
 
From these two data sets, four variables, taxpayers‟ names, ID numbers, tax liability years, and 
Federal adjusted gross income (AGI), are extracted.  
 
The third data set is the one containing the tax return information on the 1,036 clients of Preparer 
X.  The list of taxpayers was provided by Preparer X as part of a plea bargain and the data set 
was created by the Office of Tax Enforcement within the Tax Department. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this study, we will use a technique similar to “difference in differences” method to investigate 
the letter impact on the voluntary compliance for the clients of Preparer X.  For this purpose, the 
taxpayers‟ Federal AGI reported in their State tax returns is chosen as the object of this study, 
since it is one of the best indicators of the voluntary compliance.  
 
The State personal income taxpayers are classified into two categories:  One is the experiment 
group which contains the taxpayers who received the Department letters; the other is the control 
group which contains the taxpayers who did not receive the letters.   
 The “difference-in-differences” method has been applied broadly in economic impact analyses 
since the early nineties.  Influential applications include, among others, Card and Krueger (1993, 
1994), Eissa and Liebman (1996), and Blundell, Duncan , and Meghir (1998).  This method is 
usually used to examine the impact of treatment by comparing the experiment group after 
treatment both to the experiment group before treatment and to some other control group. This 
method uses a control group to subtract out changes caused by factors other than the treatment, 
assuming that the changes caused by factors other than the treatment are identical among the 
experiment and control groups. For a detailed discussion of the “difference-in-differences” 
method, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).   
 
In this study, we have similar assumptions as those underlying the “difference-in-differences” 
method and the main principles underlying this study are the same as those underlying the 
“difference-in-differences” method.  In the “difference-in-differences” method, people examine 
changes “in differences”, while in this study, we examine changes “in relative positions” in 
normally-distributed observations.  Therefore, we call our method “difference in positions”. 
 
Specifically, we made three assumptions.  First, macroeconomic indicators, like the national and 
state economic situations, have the same or similar impact on Federal AGI for both the 
experiment group and the control group.  Second, the changes in Federal and State laws, policies, 
and regulations, such as changes in tax rates and deductions, have the same or similar impact on 
AGI for both the experiment group and the control group.  And third, the ranking of AGI growth 
rate for a randomly-drawn sample of taxpayers among all samples, as long as the samples are 
large enough,  is consistent over time, except in cases where there are factors which affect only 
the taxpayers in that sample.  The third assumption is reasonable because 1) samples are 
randomly drawn; 2) the components of samples remain the same over time; and 3) all 
externalities with the exception of the letters have the same impact on the growth of AGI for all 
samples. 
 
Based on these assumptions, it is clear that, if there is a significant change in the ranking of the 
AGI growth rate for the experiment group among all samples, the change must arise from factors 
which are only applicable to the experiment group.  What is the difference between the 
experiment group and samples of the control group?  The only difference is that the individuals 
in the experiment group are the taxpayers who received the Tax Department letters, while the 
individuals in other samples did not.  Therefore, we attribute the ranking change, if any, to the 
letter impact. 
 
 
 4. Estimation Procedure 
 
There are six steps used to estimate the letter impact.  The first step is the classification of 
taxpayers.  Initially, a group of more than 4.6 million New York State personal income taxpayers 
are selected from the whole population.  These taxpayers are chosen because they meet the 
following two conditions: 1) they filed State tax returns for each of the four years in our study 
period (form 2006 to 2009); and 2) their identities can be explicitly verified.  Cases in which two 
or more taxpayers share the same identification number or in which a taxpayer doesn‟t have a 
valid identification number are dropped.  The total taxpayers are classified into two groups, the 
experiment group and the control group, as specified in Eq. 1. 
 
  p = c + e       (Eq.1) 
 
where p is the total population of the taxpayers, c is the number of taxpayers in the control group, 
and e is the number of taxpayers in the experiment group. 
 
The experiment group, e, consists of 507 taxpayers, which we shall call Sample 1 (s1), as 
described in Eq. 2.  All of these taxpayers are on the list of clients provided by Preparer X and 
received the warning letters from the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.  
Originally, there are 1,036 taxpayers on the list, but about half of these 1,036 taxpayers are 
dropped because either they don‟t have complete data for the whole study period from 2006 to 
2009, or their identities could not be explicitly verified.   
 
  e = Sample 1 (s1 , 507 taxpayers)    (Eq. 2) 
 
The control group consists of taxpayers who have never been clients of Preparer X and did not 
receive the letters.  In the second step, we draw 10,000 samples from the control group, as 
described in Eq. 3.  Each sample contains 500 taxpayers who are randomly drawn from the 
population of 4,555,397 taxpayers (with replacement) in the control group.      
 
                               Sample 2 (s2 , 500 taxpayers) 
Sample 3 (s3 , 500 taxpayers) 
                      c =  Sample 4 (s4 , 500 taxpayers)   (Eq.3) 
   …… 
   Sample 10,001 (s10001 , 500 taxpayers) 
 
In the third step, the individual AGI of the 500 taxpayers in each sample obtained from Step Two 
is summed up to aggregate AGI for each year from 2006 to 2009, as described in Eq. 4. 
 
  Ast  = sit      (Eq.4) 
 
where Ast is the total AGI for the taxpayers in sample s at time t, (s = 2,3, …, 10001, and t = 
2006, 2007, …, 2009) and AGIsit is the AGI for taxpayer i in sample s at time t, (i = 1, 2, …, 
500).   
 
Then the growth rate of the total AGI of each sample is calculated in Eq.5.   
 
  GAst = Ast  / Ast-1  - 1      (Eq. 5) 
 
where GAst is the AGI growth rate for sample s at time t.  For each sample, we have three years 
of AGI growth rates, from 2007 to 2009.  In a similar manner, we calculate the growth rates of 
total AGI for the 507 taxpayers in the experiment group, s1.  The result is that for each year from 
2007 to 2009, we have 10,001 AGI growth rates, 10,000 for the control group and 1 for the 
experiment group. 
 
In the fourth step, we consider the distribution of the AGI growth rates of the 10,001 samples.  
Because all samples are randomly drawn except s1, it is expected that the distribution is normal 
or nearly normal, excluding a few outliers.  Figure 1 to figure 3 are the histograms of the AGI 
growth rate of the samples for each of the three years from 2007 to 2009, respectively.  In these 
histograms, 9,859 samples (including s1) are included while the 142 extreme outliers (less than 
1.5 percent of the total) are dropped.   
 
 
Figure 1. 
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  Figure 2.       
     
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
      
 
In the fifth step, we draw a vertical reference line in each of these histograms to represent the 
growth rate of AGI of the experiment group (s1) to see if there is a distinctive change in the 
relative positions for the experiment group over time.  It is apparent that, from 2007 to 2008, 
there is a huge shift (relative to the normal curves) from left to right for the reference line, and, 
from 2008 to 2009, a huge shift from right to left.  The graphs show that the position of the 
reference line in 2009 is very similar to that in 2007. 
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The letter impact on the reported AGI growth for the experiment group is calculated in step six.  
First, we calculate the percentile of the AGI growth of the experiment group among all samples 
in the base year (2007 tax year, before the letters were sent).  Then we use the calculated 
percentile to find out what the growth rate would be in 2008 and 2009 (we call it assumed 
growth rate) if no letters had been sent, assuming there is a consistency in the relative position 
for the experiment group.  The difference between the actual AGI growth rate of the experiment 
group and the assumed rate then is attributed to the letter impact on reported AGI.  The 
estimation results are presented in Table 1 followed by a detailed explanation of the table. 
 
 
Table 1.  
 
           Impact of Department Letters on Reported AGI 
 
  
(For the 507 Taxpayers in the Experiment Group) 
 
         
  
Actual  Rank Growth  Assumed  Assumed  Impact  Impact  
 
AGI Growth in Percentile Percentile Growth on Growth  on AGI 
Year   ($millions) Rate (%) Growth*  * (2007)* Rate (%) (percentage ($millions) 
       
Points) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
         2006 47.50 
       2007 49.60 4.43     1,935  19.6 19.6 4.43 
  2008 55.67 12.23     9,522  96.6 19.6 -5.26 17.49 8.68 
2009 51.28 -7.89     2,723  27.6 19.6 -9.37 1.48 0.82 
 
* Rank and percentile refer to those of the experiment group among all samples. 
 
In Table 1, Column (b) is the reported AGI for the 507 taxpayers in the experiment group (s1) 
and Column (c) is the AGI growth rate.  The rank of the growth rate of the experiment group 
among the 9,859 samples (from lowest to highest) is presented in Column (d).  For example, in 
2007, the growth rate of 4.43 percent for the experiment group ranks 1,935th among the 9,859 
samples.  Then we calculate the percentile of the growth by dividing the rank by 9,859, which is 
presented in Column (e).  For 2007, the growth rate for the experiment group is 19.6th percentile 
(1,935/9,859). 
 
Based on our assumptions presented in Section 3, we have already reasoned that, if there is no 
letter impact, there would be no significant changes, compared with 2007, in the ranking of the 
AGI growth rate in 2008 and 2009 for the experiment group.  That just means the percentile in 
the growth rate of the experiment group for 2008 and 2009 would remain the same as or similar 
to that for 2007, 19.6th percentile.  Therefore, we apply the 19.6th percentile to both 2008 and 
2009 as the assumed percentile, as presented in column (f).  Then we use the growth rate of the 
sample with 19.6th percentile in 2008 as the assumed growth rate of the experiment group for 
2008.  Also, we apply the same method to obtain the assumed growth rate of the experiment 
group for 2009.  In 2008, the growth rate of the sample with 19.6th percentile is -5.26 percent; 
while in 2009, the growth rate of the sample with 19.6th percentile is -9.37 percent.  The 
assumed growth rate is presented in Column (g).  We call the -5.26 percent for 2008 and -9.37 
percent for 2009 “the assumed growth rate” because these would be assumed as the real growth 
rates for the experiment group if the taxpayers in this group had not received the Department 
letters.  
 
The letter impact on AGI growth rate is presented on Column (h), which is the difference 
between the actual growth rate, Column (c), and the assumed growth rate, Column (g).  For 
example, in 2008, the AGI for the experiment group would grow -5.26 percent if the taxpayers 
had not received the Department letters.  Instead, the actual growth rate for this group is 12.23 
percent. The difference, 12.23 - (-5.26) or 17.49 percentage points, should be regarded as the 
letter impact on the growth rate. 
 
The dollar amount of the impact on AGI is presented in Column (i), which is obtained by 
multiplying the impact on growth rate, Column (h), by the AGI (Column (b)) in the previous 
year,. 
 
It is clear in Table 1 that the letter impact is huge in 2008.  Because of the letters, the AGI 
growth rate is 12.23 percent instead of -5.26 percent. The difference is 17.49 percentage points.  
Because of the letters, the 507 taxpayers in the experiment group reported $8.68 million more in 
AGI, or $17,210 per taxpayer. After applying the median State personal income tax rate, 5.25 
percent, to the increased AGI, the State generated $0.46 million more in personal income tax 
because of the letters, averaging $899 per taxpayer. 
 
Table 1 also shows that the impact diminishes in the following year.  In 2009, the impact is only 
1.48 percentage points on AGI growth rate and $0.82 million on reported AGI.  After applying 
the median State personal income tax rate, 5.25 percent, the State generated only $0.043 million 
more in personal income tax.  One explanation for this is that because most taxpayers in the 
experiment group did not see any action by the Tax Department in 2009, they would think the 
warning in the letters was just a way for the Department to generate revenue without doing any 
actual audit work.  Therefore, the taxpayers resumed their prior behaviors in order to reduce their 
tax liabilities on their 2009 tax returns. 
 
 
5. Statistical Significance of the Estimation 
 
In this study, we attribute the relative position change in the AGI growth for the experiment 
group to the letter impact.  In this section, we will use the results of the 2008 estimation to check 
if the change is statistically significant compared with the changes of the control group by 
applying a statistical tool called “p-value”.    
 
A p-value is a measure of how much evidence we have against the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis, traditionally expressed by the symbol H0, represents the hypothesis of no change or 
no impact.  The smaller the p-value, the more evidence we have against H0. It is also a measure 
of how likely we are to get a certain sample result or a result “more extreme,” assuming H0 is 
true. 
 
In Table 1, we have already calculated the relative change of the AGI growth rate due to the 
letter impact for the experiment group.  For 2008, the change is 17.49 percentage points (Column 
(h) of Table 1).  However, from 2007 to 2008 the relative position of each of the samples of the 
control group may have also changed.  If we use the same method applied to the experiment 
group to calculate the “letter impact” for the control group samples, we may find that the “letter 
impact” may be even larger for some control group samples than that for the experiment group. 
Here, we use quotation marks for „letter impact” because they are actually not letter impact but 
impact caused by other factors (other than letters) pertaining only to the particular samples.  For 
example, if a sample contains a taxpayer who was newly appointed in 2008 to a CEO position in 
a big financial firm, then it may make the AGI growth rate of the sample much higher, 
significantly changing the relative position of the sample.  Under these circumstances, it is 
appropriate to use p-value to check the statistical significance of our estimate. 
 
In the test, the samples, one for the experiment group and 9858 for the control group, are 
regarded as a population while the experiment group (s1) is regarded as a random sample.  Our 
aim is to detect if the sample is distinctly different from the population.  We will do the test 
based on the following: 
 
 Null hypothesis (H0):  the change in AGI growth of the experimental group (s1) is not 
distinctly different from that of the population; 
 Observation O: the change in reported AGI of the experimental group (s1) is 17.49 
percentage points. 
 
A p-value of 5 percent or less would reject the null hypothesis (H0) "at the 5 percent significance 
level‟; otherwise, H0 would not be rejected. 
 
First, the change of each of the control group samples is calculated in the same way as that of the 
experiment group presented in Table 1 and the probability density of these changes is presented 
in Figure 4.  Next, we calculate the critical value of 5 percent for the relative growth change, 
which leaves 5 percent of total samples at the right tail of the curve in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
The critical value is obtained by examining the ranking of the AGI growth changes presented in 
Figure 4.  First we multiply the number of the samples by 95 percent to obtain the ranking of the 
sample with 95 percentile, which is 9,366 (9,859x0.95=9,366).  Then we sort the AGI growth 
changes of the samples from low to high and obtain the AGI growth change of the sample which 
is ranked 9,366th.    It is found that the AGI growth change for this sample is 16.74 percentage 
points, which is considered to be the critical value corresponding to the 5 percent p-value.  In 
Figure 4, the area under the curve on the left-hand side of the critical value represents 95 percent 
of the samples, while the area on the right-hand side of the critical value represents the remaining 
5 percent of the samples. 
 
It is clear that our observation O, 17.49 percentage points (vertical line in Figure 4), is on the 
right-hand side of the critical value.  Therefore, the null hypothesis that “the change in AGI 
growth of the experimental group is not distinctly different from that of the population” is 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level.  What does this mean in plain English?  If the letters 
have no impact (that is, if H0 were true), there would have been only less than 5 percent 
probability of observing the AGI growth change as large as 17.49 percentage points.  Therefore, 
it can be concluded that our estimation of the AGI growth change for the experiment group is 
statistically significant.  
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions  
 
In 2008, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance sent two letters to clients of a 
fraudulent tax preparer warning them of a possible audit and asking them to come forward to 
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participate in the Department‟s Voluntary Disclosure and Compliance Program if they had filed 
inaccurate tax returns in the past.  This study examines the impact of the letters on voluntary 
compliance in their future (2008 and 2009) tax returns. 
 
In this study, a research method similar to “difference in differences”, which we call “difference 
in positions”, is applied.  10,000 samples are randomly drawn from the taxpayer population and 
the AGI growth rates of these samples for each year are put into relative frequency density 
graphs.  We then examine the relative positions of the experiment group (the clients of the 
fraudulent tax preparer) in the normally distributed curves before and after the letters were sent.  
The change in the relative positions is regarded as the letter impact on voluntary compliance. 
 
It is found that the impact is significant in the first year (2008) after the letters were sent.  
Because of the letters, the clients of the fraudulent tax preparer reported a Federal AGI growth 
rate of 12.23 percent in 2008 tax returns, compared with the growth rate of -5.26 percent if there 
had been no letters sent to them.  The impact therefore is 17.49 percentage points on the AGI 
growth rate, which translates to $8.68 million more reported AGI for the 507 clients.  After 
applying the median State tax rate to the $8.68 million, the State collected $0.46 million more in 
personal income tax because of the letters. 
 
It seems that the letters have no long-run impact on voluntary compliance.  The impact 
diminishes quickly in the following year.  For 2009 tax returns, the clients of the fraudulent tax 
preparer reported a Federal AGI growth rate of -7.89 percent, compared with the growth rate of -
9.37 percent if there had been no letters sent to them.  The impact, therefore, is only 1.48 
percentage points on the AGI growth rate, which translates to $0.82 million more reported AGI 
for the 507 clients.  The State collected only $0.043 million more in personal income tax in the 
second year after the letters were sent.   
 
There is a tendency for this study to underestimate the letter impact because it uses changes in 
the reported Federal AGI to examine the impact.  Components not included in the Federal AGI 
but included in the State tax returns, such as State deductions and credits, are not considered.  In 
reality, we know that if a taxpayer makes fraudulent claims in the components of Federal AGI, 
he will have a tendency to make fraudulent claims in other components outside Federal AGI both 
in the Federal and State tax returns.  
 
Furthermore, the intention of this study is to investigate the behavior changes of the clients of a 
fraudulent tax preparer.  Though this tax preparer provided information on 1,036 clients, this 
study only includes 507 of them because of data limitations.  If the letters had an impact on the 
507 taxpayers, then they must also have had an impact on the other 529 taxpayers not included in 
this study.  Therefore, the dollar amount of the impact in this study is most likely 
underestimated.  For this reason, we think the impact on AGI growth rate may be a better 
measurement than that on the dollar amount of AGI.  
 
It should also be noted that this study concerns the letter impact on voluntary compliance in 
future tax returns after the letters were sent, not the total letter impact.  The total letter impact 
should be higher because it includes both the impact on the voluntary compliance in future tax 
returns and the impact on the pre-2008 returns for some taxpayers who decided to participate in 
the Tax Department‟s Voluntary Disclosure and Compliance Program and correct the 
inaccuracies in their pre-2008 returns. 
 
The methodology used in this paper, “difference in positions”, may be applied to further studies 
on the voluntary compliance.  For example, we use Federal AGI as the study object in this paper.  
In the future, we may apply the methodology to total taxable income or total New York State 
taxes reported in the State income tax returns.  Furthermore, the methodology may be easily 
applied to other impact studies, especially in cases where the regression analysis is not 
appropriate due to a short span of data.    
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